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Abstract: The inherence heuristic is too broad as a theoretical notion. The authors are at risk of 
applying their own heuristic in supporting itself. Nonetheless the article provides useful insight 
into the ways in which people overestimate the coherence and completeness of their 
understanding of the world. 
 
The principle that people try to make sense of the world by assuming that observed patterns are 
explainable in terms of deeper structures is clearly a fundamental aspect of intelligent cognition. 
Any species with capacities for learning beyond simple conditioning has evolved the ability to 
pick up on the deeper causal structure in the world and to use it to avoid relying on simple 
appearances. What is interesting about Cimpian and Salomon’s proposal is that they suggest that 
humans treat this as the default situation. People automatically assume there is something 
inherent in the nature of things that leads to observed patterns of behaviour or social practice, 
whether or not such a principle in fact exists. Rather than knowing the reasons for things being 
the way they are, people start with the known facts and then rationalise the underlying reasons. If 
plausible, urban myths are founded. A well-known example is the supposed meaning of the word 
“posh” as being an acronym printed on steamer tickets for the richer class of English folk bound 
for India – “port out, starboard home” – meaning a cabin on the cooler north-facing side of the 
ship. It is accepted that this explanation of the word is a fabrication, and there are many others of 
a similar nature (O’Conner & Kellerman 2009). 
As well as implicating our tendency to rationalise, there is also a clear connection 
between the inherence heuristic and Rozenblit and Keil’s (2002) discovery of the illusion of 
explanatory depth. In their studies, people claimed to understand the workings of everyday 
mechanisms such as toilet flushes or helicopter rotors, but when challenged they had to admit to 
having incoherent or at best incomplete understanding. There is such a strong pull to feel that our 
concepts must be coherent that we easily overestimate the level of comprehension that we 
possess. (Students often find this out, too, when exams come around.) 
The proposed heuristic, or perhaps it is a bias, explains a range of different behaviours. It 
also draws together many familiar characteristics of human thought – from conservatism and 
reification to attribution theory and psychological essentialism. 
The heuristic is also perhaps reflexive – the authors are themselves attributing these 
observed patterns of behaviour to an inherent inherence heuristic. There is something inherent in 
humans, they claim, which explains why they tend to assume that kinds have essences. Perhaps 
as a consequence of this reflexivity, there is a risk of the heuristic lacking explanatory power. It’s 
vaunted “explanatory promiscuity” (sect. 3.3, para. 8) is surely not a positive characteristic for 
any theory. As the authors again comment (sect. 5.2, para. 3) “the inherence heuristic can be 
invoked to explain pretty much any observed pattern,” and this could be considered to be the 
primary weakness of the proposal. For example, differences in the tendency to essentialise 
natural and artefact kinds are attributed to vague notions of the causal narratives that may be 
available to the child, but the account, here and elsewhere, is often largely circular. The authors 
are subject to their own heuristic. Children develop in particular ways because of something 
inherent in them or in their situation. The inherence heuristic is like a first stage in scientific 
exploration where the researcher suspects the presence of a deeper process generating the 
observed patterns. The question is whether the theoretical proposal made goes beyond this. 
On a more positive note, the target article does highlight the generality of the issues 
involved in people’s need to explain and understand the world. The literature on explanation has 
had a strong emphasis on causal explanation of events, but a lot of everyday explanation is much 
weaker than this. For example, Heussen and Hampton (2008) looked at how people explain the 
properties of different kind concepts. Why are emeralds expensive, or why do catfish have gills? 
Explanations followed some familiar patterns, such as cause and effect (glass is transparent 
because of its molecular structure), functional (catfish have gills in order to breathe under water), 
teleological (axes have blades because they are used for chopping), and categorical (penguins 
have feathers because they are birds). But, interestingly, many explanations were underspecified, 
simply explaining one property in terms of another in a relatively vague way. In several cases, 
explanations were considered plausible in each direction – a symmetrical explanation that raises 
obvious concerns of circularity. Whistles are loud because they are used for alerting people, but 
they are used for alerting people because they are loud. Dolphins are mammals because they give 
birth to live young, and they give birth to live young because they are mammals. 
The circularity of these explanations speaks to the underlying homeostatic web of 
interlocking features that characterise our concepts (Boyd 1999; Quine 1960). Understanding a 
topic involves finding the relations that link the different aspects of a concept, without the need 
for a clear narrative moving from a primitive deep starting point through to the surface features 
that we observe. It is possible therefore that the inherent property that people appeal to when 
accounting for girls wearing pink or people drinking orange juice for breakfast may often be a 
shorthand for this unanalysed set of interlinked properties. 
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